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1. Introduction
The past decades have been harsh for young workers as their unemployment rate was double
the rest of the populations in many developed countries. In Europe the youth unemployment
rate (15 to 24 y.o.) was around twice as high as the total unemployment rate throughout
the last decade (source : Eurostat). In the Euro zone, known for its low flexibility, this rate
was at 16% in 2008 and almost 21% in 2010, with a peak of 42% in 2010 for Spain. In the
United-States, where the labor market is flexible, in the same period, the rate also grew from
12,8% to 18,4% (source : Bureau of Labor Statistics).
Not only have young workers been penalized by economic shocks, being the first in line
to be affected by the economic crisis, but they also faced a progressive change in their
career path independent of the degree of flexibility of labor markets. In the literature on
internal/external markets (see Kerr 1954, Dunlop 1958, and Doeringer and Piore 1971)
workers habitually entered the firm at the bottom and climbed the social ladder internally.
Nowadays this career path is rare. A worker’s career takes place inter-firms with the worker
searching on the job and changing employers often. According to Amossé (2002), 2 out
of 3 promotions implied a change of firm in 2001-2002 whereas this figure was of 1/2 in
1991-1992. In the USA, young workers hold an average of 7 jobs in 10 years (see Topel and
Ward 1992), with 2/3 of their professional mobility taking place at the beginning of their
career. Several studies also showed the importance of this on-the-job search process. For
instance, in the USA, 50% of new contracts are job-to-job transitions (Fallick and Fleishman
2004). It concerns specifically low wage earners (Topel and Ward 1992, Charner and Fraser
1984), young workers (Skuterud 2005, Pissarides and Wadsworth 1994), and underemployed
workers (Altonji and Paxson 1988). Obtaining promotion in a new job requires training in
a previous job. But when job separation involuntarily occurs before the worker is trained,
there is no chance for her to be promoted in the next job.
This brief article proposes a theoretical framework depicting the career path of workers
and showing the consequences of job instability in the labor market. On-the-job search and
learning-by-doing of young workers are introduced in a search-matching model (Pissarides
2000) where the labor market is segmented into two interdependent sub-markets: the be-
ginners’ sub-market composed of beginners, and the experienced sub-market composed of
experienced workers earning higher wages. Untrained beginners have to train themselves on
the job through a learning-by-doing process before being able to search while on the job for
an experienced job. The model shows that beginners’ job instability prevents them from
obtaining experienced jobs thus penalizing the overall economy.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets up the analytical framework. Section 3
solves the model and presents sub-markets interaction. Section 4 analyses the impact of job
instability and professional experience on the labor force structure, and Section 5 concludes.
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2. The Model
We introduce on-the-job search in a search-matching model (see Pissarides 2000). The
economy consists of two types of risk-neutral agents: workers and firms. Firms are infinity-
lived whereas workers have a life expectancy of 1/m, where m is the labor market exit rate.
Each worker who exits the labor market is replaced with a newcomer. Time is continuous
and all the agents discount future payoffs at rate r, with r > 0.
2.1 A segmented labor market
The labor market is divided into two sub-markets: sub-market 2 composed of beginners,
and sub-market 1 composed of experienced workers. There is a specific matching technology
in each sub-market. Firms distribute themselves in the two sub-markets; each sub-market
offering a different job type (2: beginners or 1: experienced). Type-1 job productivity
is higher than type-2, y1 > y2, so as wages w1 > w2. This wage differentiation motivates
beginners to look for a better-paying type-1 job. But only beginners which have been trained
on the job in sub-market 2 are perceived as sufficiently experienced to be desirable on type-
1 jobs. Trained beginners are thus the only ones searching on the job. When their search
succeeds they become experienced workers. This professional path implies that the two labor
sub-markets interact.
Assuming a constant labor force, workers’ flows are depicted by figure 1, where u1 is
experienced unemployment, u2, beginners unemployment, `1, experienced employment, `2,
untrained beginners employment, ˆ̀2, trained beginners employment. pi, i = {1, 2}, is the
rate at which a worker finds a type-i job, si is the type-i job separation rate. Due to their lack
of experience, beginners must train themselves before applying to type-1 job. 1/λ represents
the expected average duration that a worker must face before having access to this trained
stage, a beginner becomes employable by a type-1 firm at rate λ.
Figure 1: Workers’ flows
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A matching function is defined for each sub-market. In sub-market 1, the tightness θ1
depends on the number of type-1 vacancies v1, on that of unemployed experienced workers u1,
and on that of trained beginners ˆ̀2 as they are engaged in an on-the-job search process. θ1 =
v1
u1+ˆ̀2
is the experienced sub-market tightness. The matching function, h1 = h1(v1, (u1 + ˆ̀2)),
is increasing in both its arguments, concave and homogeneous of degree 1. Job vacancies
are filled by random sorting according to a Poisson process of rate q1. The homogeneity
of the matching function implies q1 = h1(v1,(u1+
ˆ̀
2))
v1
= h1
(
1, 1
θ1
)
= q1(θ1), where q1 is the
rate at which an vacant type-1 job is filled. By the properties of the matching technology,
q′1(θ1) ≤ 0. Unemployed experienced workers and trained beginners find a type-1 job at rate
p1, determined as p1(θ1) = θ1q1(θ1) with p′1(θ1) ≥ 0.
In sub-market 2, the tightness θ2 depends on the number of type-2 job vacancies v2 and on
the number of unemployed beginners u2, θ2 = v2u2 . The matching function is h2 = h2(v2;u2).
A vacant type-2 job is filled at rate q2 = q2(θ2), with q2(θ2) ≤ 0, and unemployed beginners
find type-2 jobs at rate p2(θ2) = θ2q2(θ2), with p′2(θ2) ≥ 0. The absolute value of the elasticity
of q2(θ2) is η2(θ2) ∈ [0, 1].
2.2 Asset values
All unemployed workers produce d < y2 < y1 units of output at home for self-consumption.
All workers, employed and unemployed, exit the labor market at rate m. Each firm hires a
single worker. A firm opens a job vacancy and faces a cost ci with i = {1, 2} of keeping the
vacancy open, with c2 < c1 due to differences in job productivity.
In sub-market 1, W1 denotes the asset value of an experienced worker, and U1 that of an
unemployed experienced worker. Let J1 be the asset value of a firm with an occupied type-1
job, and JV1 that of a firm in a situation of vacancy. We have:
rU1 = d+ p1 [W1 − U1]−mU1 (1)
rW1 = w1 − s1 [W1 − U1]−mW1 (2)
rJ1 = y1 − w1 − (s1 +m)[J1 − JV1 ] (3)
rJV1 = −c1 + q1[J1 − JV1 ] (4)
When a firm and its employee separate at rate s1, the worker becomes an unemployed
experienced worker and the firm is in a situation of vacancy. An unemployed worker (a firm)
finds a type-1 job (a worker) at rate p1 (q1). Here we assume that spells of unemployment of
experienced workers do not downgrade workers’ skills. A firm with an occupied job produces
y1 and pays w1 to its experienced worker.
In sub-market 2, W2 is the asset value of an employed beginner, Ŵ2 that of a trained
beginner, and U2 that of an unemployed beginner. Let Ĵ2 be the asset value of a firm whose
job is filled with a trained beginner, J2 that of a firm whose job is filled with an untrained
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beginner, and JV2 that of a firm with a vacant job, we have:
rU2 = d+ p2[W2 − U2]−mU2 (5)
rW2 = w2 − s2[W2 − U2] + λ[Ŵ2 −W2]−mW2 (6)
rŴ2 = w2 − s2[Ŵ2 − U2] + p1[W1 − Ŵ2]−mŴ2 (7)
rĴ2 = y2 − w2 − (s2 +m+ p1)[Ĵ2 − JV2 ] (8)
rJ2 = y2 − w2 − (s2 +m)[J2 − JV2 ]− λ[J2 − Ĵ2] (9)
rJV2 = −c2 + q2[J2 − JV2 ] (10)
When a beginner loses her job at rate s2, she automatically loses her trained status (if
she previously had it) and thus becomes an unemployed beginner. A firm offers w2 to its
employee and produces y2. When a firm separates from its worker at rate s2, it becomes
a firm in a situation of vacancy. A firm employing a trained beginner faces a probability
p1 that its worker leaves the job for a type-1 job, whereas the firm employing an untrained
beginner faces the probability λ that its employee becomes trained.
Firms distribute themselves between the two sub-markets according to the free entry
condition so that JVi = 0 with i = {1, 2}.
3. Equilibrium and sub-markets interaction
3.1 Wage setting
From now on we assume that the sub-market 2 wage is constrained by a binding mandatory
minimum wage1 so that w2 = w̄2. In sub-market 1, the wage is negotiated according to a
Nash bargaining game, where β ∈ [0, 1] is the bargaining power of workers. Combining the
sharing rule of the global surplus (1−β)[W1−U1] = βJ1 with (1), (2), (3) and the free-entry
condition leads to the wage equilibrium equation:
w1 =
βy1(r + s1 + p1 +m) + (1− β)d(r + s1 +m)
β(r + s1 + p1 +m) + (1− β)(r + s1 +m)
(11)
3.2 Job creation
There is one equilibrium equation in each sub-market. In sub-market 1, the equilibrium is
determined by combining (3), (4), (11) and the free-entry condition:
0 = −c1 + q1(1− β)
y1 − d
r +m+ s1 + βp1
(12)
Equation (12) depends exclusively on the experienced sub-market tightness θ1. As θ1 is
independent of θ2, job creation in sub-market 2 does not impact either on type-1 job creation
or on experienced wage.
1Overall Results can be extended to apply to a bargained wage.
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In sub-market 2, combining (8), (9), (10), and the free-entry condition gives the sub-
market equilibrium equation for job creation:
0 = −c2 + q2
(y2 − w̄2)(r + s2 +m+ λ+ p1)
(r + s2 +m+ p1)(r + s2 +m+ λ)
(13)
Equation (13) determines the beginners’ sub-market tightness θ2 as a function of the ex-
perienced sub-market tightness θ1, ∂θ2∂θ1 < 0 (see Appendix B). When the rate p1 rises,
trained beginners leave their type-2 job more easily, hence the value of occupied type-2 jobs
decreases. Less jobs are thus created in sub-market 2.
3.3 Labor force structure in steady-state equilibrium
The total labor force is normalized to 1. In steady-state, inflows of workers equalize outflows
of workers for each employment state2. These flows are given respectively for u2, u1, `1, `2, ˆ̀2:
u2(p2 +m) = s2(`2 + ˆ̀2)+m; u1(p1 +m) = s1`1; p2u2 = `2(s2 +m+λ); λ`2 = ˆ̀2(s2 +m+p1);
`1(s1 +m) = p1(u1 + ˆ̀2). Combining these equations gives the labor force structure in steady-
state. We have: `2 = p2m(s2+m+p1)φ , ˆ̀2 =
p2mλ
φ
, u2 = m(s2+m+p1)(s2+m+λ)φ , `1 =
λp2p1(m+p1)
φ(s1+m+p1)
,
u1 =
λp2p1s1
φ(s1+m+p1)
, where φ = m(s2 +m+ p1)(s2 +m+ p2 +λ) +λp2(m+ p1). Even if tightness
θ1 is independent of tightness θ2, employment in sub-market 1 depends on job creation in
sub-market 2. Thus the employment level of trained beginners does determine the level of
the most productive jobs in the economy.
Table 1 depicts direct impacts of tightness θi on the labor force structure in the steady-
state equilibrium3. A rise in θ2 increases type-2 job creation thus raising employment in
Table 1: Direct impact of sub-market tightness on labor force structure
`2 ˆ̀2 u2 `1 u1 `1 + u1
θ1 - - - + ? +
θ2 + + - + + +
sub-market 2 (direct impact). There are thus more applicants who are likely to become
experienced. We observe a rise in the experienced sub-market size (indirect impact).
A rise in θ1 increases type-1 job creation thus raising employment in the experienced
sub-market (direct impact). However, as an increase in θ1 reduces θ2, type-2 job creation
decreases. It is easier to find a type-1 job, but there are less on-the-job searchers applying for
type-1 jobs, thus lowering experienced employment (indirect impact). The rise of experienced
employment is thwarted by the reaction of the beginners’ sub-market. Here the overall impact
on the labor force structure depends on the reaction of each employment level with respect to
θ1 and θ2. For `2 and ˆ̀2, θ1 and θ2 have opposite impacts, thus the effect of θ’s reinforces each
other. For u2, `1, u1 and `1 +u1, θ1 and θ2 have the same impact (positive or negative). The
2See appendix A for a summary table of the main variables and parameters of the model.
3Detailed calculus are available from the author upon request.
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overall impact therefore depends on the value of the elasticity of the probability of finding
a type-2 job, p2, with respect to θ2, (1 − η2), which mesures the strength of beginners’
sub-market reaction. Two cases should be considered:
• (1− η2) is small, p2 elasticity is weak. The matching rate of a beginner in a type-2 job
varies weakly with θ2. Thus, the effect of p1 always overcomes that of p2.
• (1 − η2) is big, p2 elasticity is strong. A raise in θ2 can lead to a sufficiently large
variation of p2 to overcome the effect of θ1. The effect of p2 dominates that of p1.
4. Employment instability and workers’ experience
4.1 Employment instability
In Europe youth unemployment is a major issue to which successive governments responded
by making short fixed-term jobs more readily obtainable. These contracts are often asso-
ciated with employment instability as firms are more likely to use them during periods of
economic instability. Government employment policy disregards the fact that job openings,
reserved for beginners, are only a first step in their career path whose final objective is to
secure a stable, better-paying job. Blanchard and Landier (2002) argue that the main effect
of an increase of fixed-term contracts may be high turnover of beginners, leading to higher
unemployment, and may possibly reduce overall productivity and output. Introducing on-
the-job search allows us to explain the negative impact of this employment instability.
Table 2 gives the comparative statics of the separation rate s2. A rise in s2 corresponds to
Table 2: Impact of a rise in the separation rate s2
θ2 p2 q2 θ1 p1 q1 w1 `2 ˆ̀2 u2 `1 u1 `1 + u1
s2 - - + 0 0 0 0 ? - + - - -
a higher instability of beginners’ jobs. Beginners, trained or untrained, are more likely to lose
their jobs. Job instability not only increases unemployment in sub-market 2, it also negatively
affects the probability p2 for an unemployed beginner to find a type-2 job. An increased
number of unemployed workers thus face a lower chance to obtain a type-2 job. For this
reason, the impact on untrained beginners employment `2 is not immediate, whereas trained
beginners employment ˆ̀2 decreases. There are less trained workers searching for a type-1
job. As a consequence experienced employment `1 is reduced. Experienced unemployment
u1 is reduced as well because fewer experienced workers face the same separation rate, s1.
When job instability increases young workers struggle to accumulate the years of successful
professional experience necessary to obtain a more productive job. It is harmful for type-
1 firms as they meet with increasing difficulties in finding applicants with the experience
required.
This suggests that employment policies aiming for an increase in young workers job
supply, by promoting short-term contracts or time limited contracts, do not have a positive
impact for the most productive jobs.
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During periods of crisis, experienced workers are also penalized by job instability. A rise
in s1 captures this job instability. The comparative statics is given in Table 3. Because
Table 3: Impact of a rise in the separation rate s1
θ2 p2 q2 θ1 p1 q1 w1
s1 + + - - - + -
`2 ˆ̀2 u2 `1 u1 `1 + u1
1− η2 1− η2 1− η2 1− η2 1− η2 1− η2
strong weak strong weak strong weak
s1 + + - + ? - ? + -
of sub-market interaction experienced job instability reduces p1 thus increasing p2. The
chance for unemployed beginners to obtain a job increases. As a consequence more type-2
jobs are created, raising the number of trained on-the-job searchers. The overall impact on
the experienced sub-market therefore depends on the value of η2. A value of the elasticity
(1 − η2) ∈ [0, 1] that cancels both effects is defined for each variable u2, `1, `1 + u1 (see
appendix C). η′2 = Γ′(r,m, s2, p1, λ), η′′2 = Γ′′(r,m, s2, s1, p2, p1, λ) and η′′′2 = Γ′′′(r,m, s2, p1)
are respectively the value for u2, `1 and `1 + u1. Note that both situations, (1 − η2) weak
and strong, exist and take place at the threshold of the set of definition [0;1].
When (1−η2) is weak, experienced employment decreases due both to the reduction of p1
and the rise of s2. Beginners unemployment increases because on-the-job searchers face fewer
chances of getting a type-1 job, creating a larger number of on-the-job searchers exposed to
the separation rate s2. The size of sub-market 1 is reduced and beginners unemployment
increases. When (1− η2) is strong, there are more young workers facing the smaller chance
p1 of obtaining a type-1 job. Thus more beginners obtain a type-1 job. The impact of
job instability on experienced employment remains unclear, however it decreases beginners
unemployment and the size of sub-market 1 increases.
4.2 Professional experience
A change in the parameter λ embodies the idea that the length of previously acquired profes-
sional experience can be a more or less important factor for experienced firms in employing
a beginner. For beginners, a rise in the chance of becoming trained generates two opposite
effects (see appendix C). An increase in λ makes young workers more quickly eligible for
type-1 jobs, leading to a rise in experienced employment. But the raise of λ reduces the
value of occupied type-2 jobs, the consequence being less job creation and thus less on-the-
job searchers. Again, the dominant effect depends on the value of (1 − η2) (see table 4).
When (1 − η2) is weak, the predominant effect leads to a rise in the number of trained
beginners (on-the-job search) thus increasing the size of the experienced sub-market. When
(1−η2) is strong, the predominant effect reduces job creation in the experienced sub-market
leading to a cut in the size of the beginners’ sub-market.
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Table 4: Impact of a rise in λ
`2 ˆ̀2 u2 `1 u1 `1 + u1
1− η2 1− η2 1− η2 1− η2 1− η2 1− η2 1− η2 1− η2 1− η2 1− η2
strong weak strong weak strong weak strong weak strong weak
λ - - + + - - + - + - +
During periods of crisis, and more generally when there is a shortage of jobs, firms can
allow themselves to be more fussy about workers’ professional experience. This phenomenon
corresponds to a reduction in λ resulting in impacts which are the opposite of those presented
in table 4. It is interesting to note that such a demand from firms reduces youth unemploy-
ment and fosters experienced job creation when (1 − η2) is strong. But when (1 − η2) is
weak this phenomenon strongly penalizes the overall labor market by reducing youth and
experienced employment.
5. Conclusion
Young workers belonging to the beginners’ sub-market must train themselves on the job
before acquiring the professional experience necessary to obtain a better-paying high-skill
job in the experienced sub-market. When job instability arises, due, for instance, to eco-
nomic shocks, job separation increases for all types of jobs either open to beginners or to
experienced workers. Moreover, job shortage allows firms to be more fussy about work-
ers’ professional experience. In this paper, each of these three points has been individually
appraised in relation to their impact on the labor market structure. Due to sub-market
interactions, the accumulation of these points strongly increases youth unemployment and
penalizes experienced employment when the elasticity of finding a beginner’s job with re-
spect to the tightness of the beginners’ sub-market is weak. When this elasticity is strong
the result may not hold and should be reassessed by performing a calibration of the model.
One limit of the model concerns employment instability. In order to better account
for youth employment instability, our model should endogenize the job destruction process.
When economic shocks occur, firms separate from their employees, but the firm does not
necessarily disappear. They reduce their labor force in order to remain productive. Hence
job separation would not necessarily lead to a cut in productivity. This point will be the
focus of further research.
The model presented in this note highlights the importance of on-the-job search of young
workers and presents the interactions of the beginners and the experienced sub-markets.
Its framework can be extended to analyse the impact of several institutions such as the
minimum wage and unemployment benefits. It can also serve as the baseline for research
dealing with the impact on the labor force structure of formal education and of learning-by-
doing of workers either in developed economies or in developing economies. These issues are
the purpose of ongoing research.
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A Variables and parameters list
Variable/ Description
parameter
m Labor market exit rate
r Rate at which agents discount future payoffs
ci Cost of keeping a type-i vacancy open
yi Productivity in a type-i job
wi Wages for a type-i job
β Wage bargaining power of workers
pi Rate at which a worker finds a type-i job
qi Rate at which a type-i vacancy is filled with a worker
θi Tightness in sub-market-i
η2 Elasticity of the probability for a type-2 firm to find a worker, q2, with respect
to tightness θ2.
si Separation rate from a type-i job
λ Rate at which untrained workers become trained/employable in type-1 firms
`2 Untrained beginners employment
ˆ̀
2 Trained beginners employment
u2 Beginners unemployment
u1 Experienced workers unemployment
`1 Experienced workers employment
B Relation between θ1 and θ2
The relation between θ1 and θ2 is determined by (13). ∂θ2∂θ1 =
p′1(θ1)
q′2(θ2)
c2(r+s2+m+λ)−q2(y2−w̄2)
(r+s2+m+λ+p1)(y2−w̄2)
Around the equilibrium c2(r + s2 +m+ λ) > q2(y2 − w̄2). It implies ∂θ2∂θ1 < 0.
C Comparative Statics of labor force structure
Note X = {`2, ˆ̀2, u2, `1, u1, `1 + u1}, the effect of s1 on X is defined such as
dX
ds1
=
∂X
∂s1︸︷︷︸
direct
+
∂X
∂p1
∂p1
∂θ1
∂θ1
∂s1︸ ︷︷ ︸
indirect by θ1
+
∂X
∂p2
∂p2
∂θ2
∂θ2
∂p1
∂p1
∂θ1
∂θ1
∂s1︸ ︷︷ ︸
indirect by θ2(θ1)
The overall indirect impact of s1 on the labor force structure goes through two effects via θ1
and θ2. The one that overcomes depends on the value of (1− η2) and thus on η2.
Proof. The overall indirect impact of s1 can be resumed as ∂p1∂θ1
∂θ1
∂s1
[
∂X
∂p2
∂p2
∂θ2
∂θ2
∂p1
+ ∂X
∂p1
]
Noting µ = ∂p2
∂θ2
∂θ2
∂p1
= p2λ
(r+m+s2+p1)(r+s2+m+p1+λ)
[
1−η2
−η2
]
< 0. The value of η2 that cancels
both effects is determined by
[
∂X
∂p2
µ+ ∂X
∂p1
]
where µ = µ(η2).
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Both effects cancel each other for the following values of η2 ∈ [0, 1]:
Application to u2:
η′2 =
(s2 +m+ p1) [m(s2 +m+ p1) + λ(m+ p1)]
(s2 +m+ p1) [m(s2 +m+ p1) + λ(m+ p1)] + s2(r + s2 +m+ p1)(r + s2 +m+ p1 + λ)
Application to `1:
η′′2 = λmp1(s1 +m+ p1)(s2 +m+ p1)(m+ p1)(s2 +m+ λ)
[
(r +m+ s2 + p1)(r + s2 +m+ p1 + λ)(
m(s2 +m+ p2 + λ)(s1 +m+ p1)[(s2 +m)(m+ p1) + p1s1] + p2λ(s1 +m)(m+ p1)
2
)
+ λmp1(s1 +m+ p1)(s2 +m+ p1)(m+ p1)(s2 +m+ λ)
]−1
Application to (`1 + u1):
η′′′2 =
λp1(s2 +m+ p1)
λp1(s2 +m+ p1) + (s2 +m+ p2)(r + s2 +m+ p1)(r + s2 +m+ p1 + λ)
Let x2 = {s2, λ}, the incidence of x2 on X can be written as:
dX
dx2
=
∂X
∂x2︸︷︷︸
direct
+
∂X
∂p2
∂p2
∂θ2
∂θ2
∂x2︸ ︷︷ ︸
indirect by θ2
The impact of s2 is either straightforward or undefinable. The overall impact of λ on labor
force structure depends on the value of (1− η2).
dX
dλ
= ∂X
∂λ
+ ∂X
∂p2
∂p2
∂λ
= ∂X
∂λ
+ λp2
(r+s2+m+p1)(r+s2+m+p1+λ)
[
1−η2
−η2
]
∂p2
∂λ
Concerning ˆ̀2, u1, `1 and u1 + `1, the value of η2, defined on [0, 1], that cancels both effects
is determined by:
η̂2 =
λ2(s2 +m+ λ)
λ2(s2 +m+ λ) + (s2 +m+ p2)(r + s2 +m+ p1)(r + s2 +m+ p1 + λ)
Concerning u2, the value of η2, defined on [0, 1], that cancels both effects is determined by:
η̃2 =
λ(s2 +m+ λ)[m(s2 +m+ p1) + λ(m+ p1)]
λ(s2 +m+ λ)[m(s2 +m+ p1) + λ(m+ p1)] + s2p1(r + s2 +m+ p1)(r + s2 +m+ p1 + λ)
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